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COMMENT
THE VAGUENESS OF PARTIAL-BIRTH




In 1997, President Clinton vetoed the most recent incarna-
tion of the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban'-a controversial piece of
legislation that prescribes criminal penalties such as fines and
imprisonment for any physician performing such an abortion.
Thirty states have enacted their own versions of the Partial-Birth
Abortion Ban, only some of which are currently in effect.3  Sev-
' H.P. 1122, 105th Cong. § 2 (1997). Congress has invoked the Commerce Clause power to
justify its authority to regulate partial-birth abortions. See id. § 2(a). For an interesting discus-
sion of whether Congress has the power to regulate partial-birth abortions under the Commerce
Clause in light of the Supreme Court's decision to curtail the scope of the Commerce Clause in
United States v. Lopez, see David B. Kopel & Glenn H. Reynolds, Taking Federalism Seriously: Lopez
and the PatWiai-Birth Abortion Ban Act; 30 CONN. L. REv. 59 (1997) (discussing United States v. Lo-
pez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995)).
' See H.R 1122, § 2(a). All of the partial-birth abortion bans, except the Missouri ban, con-
tain a provision that the pregnant woman upon whom the procedure is performed may not be
prosecuted for conspiracy to violate the statute. See infra note3. See also H.R. 1122, § 2(a).
'The following states have enacted bans: Alabama (ALA. CODE § 26-23-2 to -4 (Supp. 1998));
Alaska (ALASKA STAT. § 18.16.050 (Michie 1998)); Arizona (ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3603.01
(West Supp. 1998)); Arkansas (ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-61-202 to -203 (Michie 1997)); Florida (FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 390.011,-.0111 (West Supp. 1999)); Georgia (GA. CODEANN. § 16-12-144 (1999));
Idaho (IDAHO CODE § 18-613 (Supp. 1999)); Illinois (720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 513/5-5, -10, -20
(West 1998)); Indiana (IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-18-2-267.5, 16-34-2-1 (b) (West Supp. 1998)); Iowa
(IowA CODE ANN. § 707.8A (West Supp. 1999)); Kansas (1998 Kan. Sess. Laws 142); Kentucky
(KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.720, -.765, -.990 (Michie Supp. 1998)); Louisiana (LA. REV. STAT.
ANN § 14:32.9 (West Supp. 1999)); Michigan (MICH. COMp. LAwS § 333.17016 (West Supp.
1999)); Mississippi (MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-71, -73 (1999)); Missouri (1999 Mo. Legis. Serv.
427 (West)); Montana (MONT. CODEANN. § 50-20-401 (1997)); Nebraska (NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-
326, -328 (Supp. 1998)); NewJersey (NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:65A-6 (West Supp. 1999)); North Da-
kota (N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.6-01 to -03 (1999)); Ohio (OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.15
1233
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eral of these bans have been enjoined pending trial or have
been permanently enjoined . In January 2000, the Supreme
Court agreed to review the Nebraska statute, which is one of the
statutes permanently enjoined by a federal court of appeals As
this issue goes to press, the Court has not yet heard oral argu-
ments in the Nebraska case.
Opponents of the bans have challenged the constitutional-
ity of the bans on a variety of grounds.6 Two challenges-closely
related to one another-are that the bans are unconstitutionally
vague and unconstitutionally overbroad. This comment will fo-
(West 1996)); Oklahoma (OKLA. STAT. ANN., tit. 21, § 684 (West Supp. 1999)); Rhode Island
(RI. GEN. LAws § 23-4.12-1 to -3, -5 (Supp. 1998)); South Carolina (S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-85
(West Supp. 1998)); South Dakota (S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 34-23A-27, -32 (Michie Supp. 1999));
Tennessee (TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-15-209 (1997)); Utah (UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-310.5 (Supp.
1998)); Virginia (VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-74.2 (Michie Supp. 1999)); West Virginia (W. VA. CODE
§ 33-42-3, -8 (Supp. 1998)); and Wisconsin (WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.16 (West Supp. 1999)). The
bans of Virginia, Alabama, and Georgia are currently in effect after litigation. See Richmond
Med. Ctr. for Women v. Gilmore, 144 F.3d 326 (4th Cir. 1998); Summit Med. Assoc. v. James,
984 F. Supp. 1404 (M.D. Ala. 1998); Midtown Hosp. v. Miller, 36 F. Supp. 2d 1360 (N.D. Ga
1997). The Illinois and Wisconsin bans were upheld by the Seventh Circuit, sitting en banc. See
The Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 195 F.3d 857 (7th Cir. 1999). HoweverJustice Stevens has granted a
stay to the petitioners pending appeal to the Supreme Court. SeeJan Crawford Greenburg, Illi-
nois Abortion Law Suspended, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 1, 1999, at Al. There has been no judidal determi-
nation of the constitutionality of the partial-birth abortion bans of Indiana, Kansas, Mississippi,
North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Utah.
'The Arkansas, Iowa, Nebraska, Ohio, Louisiana, New Jersey, Florida, Kentucky, West Vir-
ginia, Idaho, Arizona, Michigan, Rhode Island, Alaska, Montana, and Missouri bans are not in
effect. See Planned Parenthood v. Miller, 195 F.3d 386 (8th Cir. 1999); Carhart v. Stenberg, 192
F.3d 1142 (8th Cir. 1999); Little Rock Family Planning Servs. v. Jegley, 192 F.3d 794 (8th Cir.
1999); Women's Med. Prof. Corp. v. voinovich, 130 F.3d 187 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denie, 118
S.Ct. 1347 (1998); Causeway Med. Suite v. Foster, 43 F. Supp. 2d 604 (E.D. La. 1999); Planned
Parenthood v. Verniero, 41 F. Supp. 2d 478 (D.NJ. 1999); A Choice for Women v. Butterworth,
54 F. Supp. 2d 1148 (S.D. Fla., 1998); Eubanks v. Stengel, 28 F. Supp. 2d 1024 (W.D. Ky. 1998);
Daniel v. Underwood, No. 2:98-0495, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22290 (S.D. W. Va. Nov. 5, 1998);
Weyhrich v. Lance, No. CIV 98-CV-117-S-BLW (D. Id. Mar. 27, 1998); Planned Parenthood v.
Woods, 982 F. Supp. 1369 (D. Ariz. 1997); Evans v. Kelley, 977 F. Supp. 1283 (E.D. Mich. 1997);
Rhode Island Med. Soc. v. Pine, CA No. 9704166 (D.RI.July 11, 1997); Planned Parenthood v.
Alaska, No. 3 AN 97-06019 CIV (Alaska Super. Ct. Mar. 13, 1998); Intermountain Planned Par-
enthood v. Montana, No. BDV 97-477 (Mont. Dist. Ct.June 29, 1998); Bill BelU,Jr., Federal Court
Challenge Delays Enforcement of New Missouri Law Until March, ST. LOUIS POsr-DSPATCH, Sept. 23,
1999, at B3.
' SeeJan Crawford Greenburg, Justices to Review Abortion Ban, CHI. TRm., Jan. 15, 2000, at Al.
See also Carhart, 192 F.3d at 1142.
' See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Miller, 1 F. Supp. 2d 958, (S.D. Iowa 1998), aFfd 195 F.3d
386 (8th Cir. 1999) (abortion providers challenged the Iowa ban on grounds, inter alia, that the
bans unconstitutionally regulated pre-viability abortion procedures). See also Evans, 977 F. Supp.
at 1285 (abortion providers challenged the Michigan ban on the grounds that the statute was
unconstitutionally vague, overbroad, and did not contain an exception to preserve the health of
the woman).
' SeeEvans, 977 F. Supp. at 1285. Both the vagueness and the overbreadth challenges center
around the specificity of the statutory language and the problems resulting from vague statutory
1999] THE VAGUENESS OFPARTIA4-BIRTHABORTION BANS 1235
cus primarily on these two challenges and demonstrate that
none of these bans is unconstitutionally vague or overbroad.
Part II will provide a backdrop to the discussion, including a de-
scription of the abortion procedure at issue, the nature of the
vagueness and overbreadth challenges to the partial-birth abor-
tion bans, and the procedural history of the litigation of the
bans.
Part III will provide a detailed analysis of the void-for-
vagueness doctrine as applied to other criminal statutes which
arguably infringe upon constitutionally protected behavior, as
the partial-birth abortion bans allegedly do. The discussion will
begin with an analysis of the appropriate standard to be applied
when mounting a facial challenge to a state statute. The com-
ment will then discuss the actus reus8 and mens rea? elements of
criminal law in relation to vagueness challenges in order to pro-
vide a sensible paradigm for the void-for-vagueness doctrine.
Part IV will discuss the nature of the vagueness challenges to
the partial-birth abortion bans. This discussion will include the
prevailing opinions in the medical community regarding the
specificity of these statutes, and the limited case law on the doc-
trine as applied to these bans.
Finally, Part V will present an argument for how the void-
for-vagueness doctrine should be applied to the partial-birth
abortion bans. The discussion will demonstrate that the doc-
language. See Note, The Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67, 76
(1960). The vagueness challenge is primarily concerned with adequate notice to persons en-
gaged in the conduct prohibited by the statute, and sufficient standards to judge when the stat-
ute has been violated. Id. See also Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109 (1972). The
overbreadth challenge is concerned with statutory language so vague or ambiguous that-al-
though intended only to prohibit conduct that is not constitutionally protected-arguably pro-
hibits constitutionally protected conduct as well. See Erznoznik v. City ofJacksonville, 422 U.S.
205 (1975).
'The term actus reus literally means "bad act." SeeJOHN KAPLAN ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW 119
(3d ed. 1996). Criminal law requires that an individual who is to be punished for a crime has
committed a criminal or bad act (an actus reus). Id. at 121. This act requirement is based on a
theory ofjust punishment; that is, punishment is only justified when an individual has engaged
in past, voluntary, bad conduct specifically proscribed in advance by statute. Id. at 123. See infra
Part III.B.
'The term mens iea means "guilty mind," and refers to the mental state of the criminal actor.
See KAPLAN, supra note 8, at 119. In addition to requiring a bad act, criminal law also imposes a
requirement that an individual being punished have a culpable state of mind (a mens rea). Id. at
196. Mens rea can be manifested in either a desire to cause some harm to another or violate
some social duty or a disregard for the welfare of another or for some social duty. Id. See infra
Part III.C.
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trine as traditionally applied in similar criminal statutes, when
applied in the partial-birth abortion context, leads to the con-
clusion that none of the bans are unconstitutionally vague or
overbroad.
II. THE HISToRIcAL BACKDROP
A. THE PARTIAL-BIRTH ABORTION PROCEDURE AND
CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO THE BANS
In order to better understand the nature of this controversy,
one must first understand the actual procedure at issue. The
term "partial-birth abortion" is commonly understood to mean
a certain method of abortion, referred to in the medical com-
munity as an "intact dilation and extraction" or "D&X" proce-
dure.'0
In the D&X procedure, the physician typically delivers the
entire body of the fetus, except the head, before the fetus is
aborted." The physician aborts the fetus by evacuating the con-
tents of the cranium, which is typically done by inserting scissors
into the base of the fetus' skull, then suctioning out the cranial
contents.12 This procedure collapses the head, thereby facilitat-
ing removal of the dead fetus.'
3
One of the main issues raised by opponents of the partial-
birth abortion bans is that the applicable statutes are vague and
ambiguous.14 The opponents contend that the bans do not pro-
vide sufficient notice to abortion providers as to which acts will
" See M. LeRoy Sprang & Mark G. Neerhof, Rationale for Banning Abortions Late in Pregnacy,
280JAMA 744 (1998). The dilation and extraction procedure is referred to as either a "D&X"
or an "intact D&E." To avoid confusion, this comment will only use the term D&X when refer-
ring to the procedure.
"SeeJanet E. Gans Epner et al., Late-term Abortion, 280JAMA 724, 726 (1998). The American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG) has described the D&X procedure as con-
sisting of the following elements: "(1) deliberate dilation of the cervix, usually over a sequence
of days; (2) instrumental conversion of the fetus to a footing breech; (3) breech extraction of
the body except the head; and (4) partial evacuation of the intracranial contents of a living fetus
to effect vaginal delivery of a dead but otherwise intact fetus." American College of Obstetri-
cians and Gynecologists Statement of Policy as Issued by the AGOG Executive Board: Statement
on Intact Dilatation and Extraction (Jan. 12, 1997) (unpublished policy statement, on file with
author).
,SeeSprang & Neerhof, supra note 10, at 745.
"See Gans Epner, supra note 11, at 726.
"See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Woods, 982 F. Supp. 1369 (D. Ariz. 1997).
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subject the abortion providers to criminal liability.15 Moreover,
a vague statute might not provide sufficient standards for a
court to determine whether the accused has, in fact, violated the
criminal statute.16 This uncertainty creates the possibility of ar-
bitrary or discriminatory enforcement of the statute.,7 Thus, the
argument goes, these statutes violate the void-for-vagueness doc-
trine embodied in the due process clauses of the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments.8
Another underlying concern regarding the alleged vague-
ness of the bans sheds some light on why opponents who chal-
lenge these bans commonly raise the vagueness argument.
Vague statutory language can-and often does-create a prob-
lem of overbreadth.19 The overbreadth problem arises when a
legislature, having the constitutional authority to regulate a cer-
tain activity, drafts a statute which contains language so vague
that it not only proscribes the intended conduct, but also pro-
scribes conduct which is constitutionally protected.0 In the case
of the partial-birth abortion bans, opponents contend that the
statutory language of the bans is so vague that it proscribes not
only the D&X procedure, but also the most commonly per-
formed abortion procedure in the second and third trimester:
the dilation and evacuation procedure, or the "D&E."2' As a re-
sult, abortion providers may refuse to perform D&Es out of fear
that they will be prosecuted under the partial-birth abortion
bans,22 despite the legislative intent to ban only the D&X proce-
dure. Under the current analysis for abortion statutes set forth
"See id. at 1379.
"SeeEvans v. Kelley, 977 F. Supp. 1283, 1304 (E.D. Mich. 1997).
17 id.
" U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, with-
out due process of law. "). U.S. CoNsT. amend XIV ("[N]or shall any State deprive any per-
son of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law....").
"See Woods, 982 F. Supp. at 1378-79.
Se The Void-For-Vaguenss Doctine in the Supreme Court, supra note 7, at 76.
" See Evans, 977 F. Supp. at 1293. See also David A. Grimes, The Continuing Need for Late Abor-
tions, 280 JAMA 747, 748 (1998). The D&E procedure consists of the following elements: (1)
dilation of the cervix over a period of several hours; (2) rupturing of the fetal membrane; (3)
dismemberment of the fetus within the uterus with surgical instruments and suction; and (4)
removal of the fetal parts, piece by piece, through the cervical os (i.e., the opening to the
uterus). Evans, 977 F. Supp. at 1293.
n See id. at 1302-03.
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by the Supreme Court in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,' if the re-
fusal of physicians to perform the traditional D&E is due to the
unconstitutional vagueness and overbreadth of these bans, this
would surely place an undue burden on a woman's right to ob-
tain an abortion.24
B. THE PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THE BANS
Three Federal courts have held that the bans of Illinois,
Wisconsin, Virginia, and Georgia are not void for vagueness.25
Other federal courts have held that the Arkansas, Iowa, Ne-
braska, Ohio, Louisiana, New Jersey, Florida, Kentucky, West
Virginia, Arizona, Michigan, and Missouri have held that partial-
26birth abortion bans are-or could be-void-for-vagueness.
The language of these statutes varies from state to state; how-
ever, this does not appear to account for the different results in
each of the courts.
In general, the courts have focused on two elements of the
bans in assessing the vagueness claims: (1) the definition of a
"partial-birth abortion" as an abortion in which the physician
"partially vaginally delivers a living fetus before killing the fetus
505 U.S. 833 (1992). The Supreme Court in Casey held that the correct standard for de-
termining the constitutionality of abortion laws is whether the statute at issue poses an undue
burden on a woman's right to obtain an abortion. Id. at 874.
"4 The statutes could arguably place an undue burden on a woman's right to obtain an abor-
tion even if they are not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. However, this comment as-
sumes that the vagueness challenge is the most serious charge leveled against the bans because
of the impact that the vagueness and overbreadth challenges have on the undue burden analy-
sis. For example, if the language of the partial birth abortion statute is not applicable to the
D&E procedure, then the ban arguably will not place an undue burden on a woman's right to
choose. Although the D&X procedure would not be available to the woman, she would still
have the option of having a D&E performed on her. Thus, due to the importance of this issue,
this comment is limited to the alleged vagueness and potentially resulting overbreadth of the
bans.
SeeThe Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 195 F.3d 857 (7th Cir. 1999) (upholding Illinois and Wiscon-
sin statutes); Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Gilmore, 144 F.3d 326 (4th Cir. 1998); Midtown
Hosp. v. Miller, 36 F. Supp. 2d 1360, 1363 (N.D. Ga. 1997).
26 See Planned Parenthood v. Miller, 195 F.3d 386 (8th Cir. 1999); Carhart v. Stenberg, 192
F.3d 1142 (8th Cir. 1999); Little Rock Family Planning Servs. v. Jegley, 192 F.3d 794 (8th Cir.
1999); Women's Med. Prof. Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187, 200 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. deni/,
118 S. Ct. 1347 (1998); Causeway Med. Suite v. Foster, 43 F. Supp. 2d 604, 619 (E.D. La. 1999);
Planned Parenthood v. Verniero, 41 F. Supp. 2d 478,493-94 (D.NJ. 1998); A Choice for Women
v. Butterworth, 54 F. Supp. 2d 1148, 1158 (S.D. Fla. 1998); Eubanks v. Stengel, 28 F. Supp. 2d
1024, 1036 (W.D. Ky. 1998); Daniel v. Underwood, No. 2:98-0495, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22290,
at *12 (S.D. W. Va. Nov. 5, 1998); Planned Parenthood v. Woods, 982 F. Supp. 1369, 1379 (D.
Ariz. 1997); Evans, 977 F. Supp. at 1311; Bell, supra note 4, atB3.
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and completing the delivery, ''27 some variant of which is com-
mon to all of the statutes except the Ohio, Kansas, North Da-
kota, and Missouri statutes, "8 and (2) the existence, or lack
thereof, of a scienter requirement in the statutes.29
See, e.g., H.R. 1122, 105th Cong. § 2(a) (1997). The Virginia ban employs the phrase "par-
tial-birth abortion," but defines it as "deliberately and intentionally delivers a living fetus or a
substantial portion thereof into the vagina for the purpose of performing a procedure the per-
son knows will kill the fetus .... " VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-74.2 (Michie Supp. 1999). The Louisi-
ana ban also employs the phrase "partial-birth abortion" but defines it as "the performance of a
procedure ... whereby a living fetus or infant is partially delivered or removed from the fe-
male's uterus by vaginal means and with specific intent to kill or do great bodily harm is then
killed prior to complete delivery or removal." LA. REv. STAT. ANN § 14:32.9 (West 1998). The
Utah ban employs the phrase "partial birth abortion" and the phrase "dilation and extraction,"
defining these phrases as: "partially vaginally delivering a living, intact fetus." UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 76.7-310.5 (Supp. 1998).
" See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.15 (West 1996); 1998 Kan. Sess. Laws 142; N.D. CENT.
CODE § 14-02.6-01 to -02 (1999); 1999 Mo. Legis. Serv. 427 (West). The Ohio ban does not em-
ploy the phrase "partial-birth abortion," but rather prohibits any person from knowingly per-
forming a "dilation and extraction procedure" upon a pregnant woman, which is defined as "the
termination of a human pregnancy by purposely inserting a suction device into the skull of a fe-
tus to remove the brain... [and] does not include either the suction curettage ... or the suc-
tion aspiration procedure of abortion." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.15. The Kansas ban,
similar to the Ohio ban, defines the phrase "partial-birth abortion" as "the deliberate and inten-
tional evacuation of all or part of the intracranial contents of a viable fetus prior to removal of
such otherwise intact fetus ... "but also explicitly states that the statute does not apply to, inter
alia, the dilation and evacuation procedure. See 1998 Kan. Sess. Laws 142. The North Dakota
ban makes it criminal to "intentionally cause[) the death of a living intact fetus while that living
intact fetus is partially born .... " N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.6-01. The phrase "partially born"
means:
the living intact fetus's body, with the entire head attached is delivered so that...
the living intact fetus's entire head, in the case of a cephalic [i.e. head first] presen-
tation, or any portion of the living intact fetus's torso above the navel, in the case of
a breech [i.e. feet first] presentation, is delivered past the mother's vaginal opening
or... [in either situation listed above] is delivered outside the mother's abdominal
wall.
Id. § 14-02.6-01.
The Missouri Legislature approached this legislation from an entirely different perspec-
tive-at least in one respect-than did the other states, by treating the statute as an infanticide
statute rather than an abortion statute. See 1999 Mo. Legis. Serv. 427. The language of the stat-
ute, however, is similar to that of the North Dakota statute. See id. The statute states, in perti-
nent part: "A person is guilty of the crime of infanticide if such person causes the death of a
living infant with the purpose to cause said death by an overt act performed when the infant is
partially born or born." Id. § AS (emphasis added). The phrase "living infant" is defined as in-
cluding "a human child ... partially born." I& § A2. The phrase "partially born" is defined as:
"[P]artial separation of a child from the mother with the child's head intact with the torso ....
[A] child is partially separated ... when the head is in a cephalic presentation, or any part of the
torso above the navel in a breech presentation, is outside the mother's external os .... " Id. §
A2(3). It bears noting that Missouri's treatment of the ban as an infanticide statute rather than
an abortion statute may bolster Missouri's asserted state interest in banning the procedure-an
important aspect of the overall discussion concerning these bans. See infra note 159. Such a dis-
cussion, however, is likely broad enough to occupy an entire article by itself and is well beyond
the scope of this comment.
See, eg., Evans, 977 F. Supp. at 1308. A scienter requirement in the context of the partial-
birth abortion bans is a mens rea requirement that the abortion provider performing the D&X
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The bans can be logically divided into four categories. The
first category consists of those statutes that contain a scienter
requirement and that further define the phrase, "partially vagi-
nally delivers a living fetus before killing the fetus" as: "deliber-
ately and intentionally delivers into the vagina a living fetus, or a
substantial portion thereof, for the purpose of performing a
procedure the physician knows will kill the fetus, and kills the
fetus.""0 Eight statutes contain these elements, as did the federal
bill vetoed by President Clinton.'
The second category consists of those statutes which contain
a scienter requirement, but do not further define the phrase,
"partially vaginally delivers a living fetus." Thirteen statutes fall
into this category.32
The third category consists of those statutes that do not con-
tain a scienter requirement, and do not further define the
phrase, "partially vaginally delivers a living fetus." Two statutes
fall into this category.
33
The fourth category consists of the statutes of Louisiana,
Virginia, Utah, Ohio, Kansas, North Dakota, and Missouri,
which differ to varying degrees from the statutes in the three
categories listed above." The bans of Louisiana and Virginia
closely resemble bans in the other three categories and will be
treated as if they belonged in one of those categories. The ban
of Louisiana, lacking a scienter requirement, logically falls into
procedure intends to perform or knows that he is performing that procedure. I&; see also supra
note 9, and accompanying text.
-See, e.g., H.R. 1122, 105th Cong. § (2) (a) (1997).
3' See IDAHO CODE § 18-613 (Supp. 1999); IOWA CODE ANN. § 707.8A (West Supp. 1999); KY.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 311.720, -.765, -.990 (Michie Supp. 1998); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-326, -328
(Supp. 1998); NJ. STAT ANN. § 2A:65A-6 (West Supp. 1999); OKLA. SAT. ANN., tit. 21, § 684
(West Supp. 1999); R.I. GEN LAws § 23-4.12-1 to -3, -5 (West Supp. 1998); TENN. CODE ANN. §
39-15-209 (1997). See also H.R. 1122, § 2(a).
" See ALA. CODE § 26-23-2 to -4 (Supp. 1998); ALASKA STAT. § 18.16.050 (Michie 1998); ARIZ.
REv. STAT. § 13-3603.01 (West Supp. 1997); ARK. CODE ANN § 5-61-202 to -203 (Michie 1997);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 390.011, -.0111 (West Supp. 1998); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-144 (1999); 720
ILL. COMP. STAT. 513/5-5, -10, -20 (West 1998); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-18-2-267.5, 16-34-2-1 (b)
(West Supp 1998); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-71, -73 (1999); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-401
(1997); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-85 (West 1998); W. VA. CODE § 33-42-3, -8 (Supp. 1999); Wis.
STATANN. § 940.16 (Supp. 1999).
See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.17016 (West Supp. 1999); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 34-23A-27,
-32 (Michie Supp. 1999).
' See supra notes 27-28.
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the third category," while the ban of Virginia, which has a scien-
ter requirement and employs the "substantial portion" language
logically falls into the first category.36  Unless otherwise speci-
fied, these bans will be treated as falling within those respective
categories. The bans of Ohio, Utah, Kansas, Missouri, and
North Dakota, however, are quite different from the others and
will be treated separately.
III. THE VOID-FOR-VAGUENESS DOCTRINE
A. THE BACKGROUND OF THE DOCTRINE
The constitutional origins of the void-for-vagueness doctrine
are somewhat obscure.37 In a few cases, the Supreme Court has
held that the doctrine is embodied in the Sixth Amendment re-
quirement that an accused be "informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation. "s More recently, the Supreme Court
has discovered the foundation for the doctrine in the due proc-
ess clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 9 It is
generally agreed, however, that the purpose of the doctrine is
twofold. First, the statute must give a criminal offender fair
warning of the proscribed behavior before he can be convicted
of the crime.40 Second, the statute must provide sufficient stan-
dards to those applying the statute, in order to avoid arbitrary or
discriminatory enforcement.41
Several commentators have noted that Supreme Court ju-
risprudence on this doctrine seems, at least at first glance, to be
See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:32.9 (West Supp. 1999).
SeevVA. CoDEANN. § 18.2-74.2 (Michie Supp. 1999).
"See The Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, supra note 7, at 67-68 n.3 (discussing
the different theories upon which the void-for-vagueness doctrine may be founded).
w U.S. CoNST. amend. VI. Sem e.g., United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 89
(1920) (implying that the need for certainty in statutory language is driven by the Sixth
Amendment requirement that a person accused of a violation of the statute is informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against them).
" See, e.g., Village of Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489,
497 (1982) (discussing the due process implications of a vaguely worded vagrancy statute);
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109 (1972) (same); Papachristou v. City ofJackson-
ville, 405 U.S. 156, 165 (1972) (same).
,0 See Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108-09 (discussing principles behind requirement that statutory
language be precise).41See i .
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highly inconsistent. 2 For example, in United States v. Ragen,43 the
Court upheld a tax evasion statute making it criminal to deduct
from taxable income more than a "reasonable allowance for
salaries."" However, in United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co.,4 the
Court invalidated a statute that made it criminal for any person
to make an "unjust or unreasonable rate in handling any neces-
saries. '' 46 Some commentators have suggested a theory that may
account for this inconsistency. One commentator, expressing
skepticism about this theory, characterized it as follows:
[T]here are two wholly separate and differently grounded kinds of
vagueness decision: the "true" uncertainty case ... in which a legislature
which might constitutionally have proscribed either or both of two
classes of behavior, A and B, has chosen to proscribe only A, but in lan-
guage so uncertain that whether most fact situations are A or B is a mat-
ter for guesswork; and the "spurious" uncertainty cases . . .in which a
legislature, constitutionally free to regulate sphere A, but forbidden to
encroach upon sphere B, has included indiscriminately within the broad
wording of a criminal statute both A cases and B cases, thereby leaving
the individual to guess at his peril whether he can or cannot be constitu-
tionally punished for violation of the statute. The evil in the first kind of
case is said to be lack of fair warning and of a standard for the adjudica-
tion of guilt; in the second, the threat that the statutes' "broad language
may throttle protected conduct. They have a coercive effect since rather
than chance prosecution people will tend to leave utterances unsaid
even though they are protected by the Constitution."
48
The problem in the so-called "spurious" cases is a problem
of the potential overbreadth of a vaguely worded statute, in
which the legislature is encroaching upon constitutionally pro-
tected conduct.49 A so-called "true" case, in contrast, concerns
the constitutionality of the vague statutory language in and of it-
self.
50
" See, e.g., Rex A. Collings, Jr., Unconstitutional Uncertainty-An Appraisal 40 CORNEU. L.Q.
195, 195-96 (1955); The Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court supra note 7, at 70-71.
314 U.S. 513 (1942).
Id. at 524.
255 U.S. 81 (1921).
4 Id. at 92.
" See, eg., Collings, supra note 42, at 195; The Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court,
supra note 7, at 67.
The Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, supra note 7, at 76 (footnotes omitted)
(quoting Collings, supra note 42, at 219).
4See Collings, supra note 42, at 197.
" See id.
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The distinction between the true and spurious cases, how-
ever, is far from clear; the true cases typically contain elements
of infringement upon constitutional rights, and the spurious
cases are often concerned with fair warning and arbitrary dis-
crimination.5' Nonetheless, the Supreme Court will more
closely scrutinize a statute that it believe falls under the "spuri-
ous" line of cases (i.e., a statute that is overbroad) than under
the "true" line of cases.5 2 In other words, a statute that could
potentially be overbroad will be held to a much higher standard
of specificity, and will therefore be easier to challenge as uncon-
stitutional than a statute that is only accused of being vaguely
worded.53
This higher standard of specificity is especially evident in
the context of First Amendment claims.54 For example, in Coates
v. City of Cincinnati,55 the Supreme Court invalidated a city ordi-
nance that made it a criminal offense for three or more persons
to assemble on a city sidewalk and conduct themselves in a
manner annoying to passers-by.56 The Court reasoned that the
ordinance "is vague, not in the sense that it requires a person to
conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible nor-
mative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard of con-
duct is .specified at all."57  Although the city was free to prevent
people from engaging in countless forms of antisocial conduct
on the streets, "it cannot constitutionally do so through the en-
actment ... of an ordinance whose violation may entirely de-
5' The Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, supra note 7, at 76-77. The author fur-
ther notes that "the so-called 'true' cases, when seen in their historical perspective, contain
many of the elements of the spurious line. Most of them date from an era when economic lais-
sez faire was for the Court the sanctum sanctorum that free speech has become today .... " Id.
(footnote omitted).
" See The Void-For-Vaguenas Doctrine in the Supreme Court supra note 7, at 75.
53 See id.
" See, e.g., Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959). The Court in Smith clearly indicated its
stance concerning statutes which regulate speech, writing: "[T]his Court has intimated that
stricter standards of permissible statutory vagueness may be applied to a statute having a poten-
tially inhibiting effect on speech ... ." Id. at 151. In subsequent cases, the Court has stated that
First Amendment cases are the only cases in which overbreadth challenges to statutes are recog-
nized. See; e.g., United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987) ("[W]e [the Supreme Court]
have not recognized an 'overbreadth' doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amend-
ment.").
402 U.S. 611 (1971).
Id. at 616.
Id. at 614 (emphasis added).
MA UREFNL. RURKA
pend upon whether or not a policeman is annoyed."58 Such a
broadly worded statute violated the constitutional right of free
assembly.59
Three Justices dissented in the Coates opinion on the
grounds that upholding a facial challenge to a statute that is
constitutionally permissible in some applications is inappropri-
ate.6° Justice White, writing for the dissenters, reasoned:
It is possible that a whole range of other acts, defined with unconsti-
tutional imprecision, is forbidden by the ordinance. But as a general
rule, when a criminal charge is based on conduct constitutionally subject
to proscription and clearly forbidden by a statute, it is no defense that
the law would be unconstitutionally vague if applied to other behavior.
Such a statute is not vague on its face. It may be vague as applied in
some circumstances, but ruling on such a challenge obviously requires
knowledge of the conduct with which a defendant is charged.
The underlying debate between the majority and the dissent
in this case concerned which standard to apply in ruling on a
facial overbreadth challenge to a statute, when the standing of
the defendants to raise the challenge is in doubt.
The Court explicitly addressed this debate in Young v.
American Mini Theatres, Inc.62 Young involved a city zoning ordi-
nance that classified "adult" movie theaters as those which pres-
ent "material distinguished or characterized by an emphasis on
matter depicting, describing or relating to 'Specified Sexual Ac-
tivities' or 'Specified Anatomical Areas,"' and restricted the lo-
cation of such theaters to avoid a concentration in any one
area.' The respondents, operators of two "adult" theaters,
claimed that the phrase "characterized by an emphasis" was
overly vague, and thus violated the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.6
The Court rejected this argument, reasoning that the re-
spondents did not have standing to raise the objection because
"Id
"Id. at 615. See U.S. CoNST. amend I.
'0 Coates, 402 U.S. at 618-20 (WhiteJ, dissenting).
"Id. at 618 (White,J, dissenting).
"427 U.S. 50 (1976).
"Id. at 52-53.
Id. at 58. See U.S. CONsT. amend XIV.
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the ordinance unquestionably applied to them.6 The Court ac-
knowledged that on some occasions it had recognized the
standing of litigants, whose own speech was unprotected, to
challenge the constitutionality of a statute that arguably prohib-
ited some protected speech.& However, "if the statute's deter-
rent effect on legitimate expression is not 'both real and
substantial,' and.., is 'readily subject to a narrowing construc-
tion by the state courts,' the litigant is not permitted to assert
the rights of third parties."67
Eleven years later, the Court further articulated the proper
standard for facial challenges to statutes outside the First
Amendment context in United States v. Salerno,6 which involved a
facial overbreadth challenge to the Bail Reform Act of 1984.69
The Court laid out the proper standard as follows:
A facial challenge to a legislative Act is ... the most difficult chal-
lenge to mount s.uccessfully, since the challenger must establish that no
set of drcumstances exists under which the Act would be valid The fact that
the... Act might operate unconstitutionally under some conceivable set
of circumstances is insufficient to render it wholly invalid, since we have
not recognized an "overbreadth" doctrine outside the limited context of
the First Amendment.
70
In a facial challenge to an abortion statute, such as a partial-
birth abortion ban, the threshold issue is whether to apply the
Salerno standard in which the challenger must show that "no set
Young; 427 U.S. at 59. The doctrine of "standing" is ajusticiability doctrine which, argua-
bly, arises from the "case or controversy" requirement of Article III of the Constitution. SeeU.S.
CONST. art. III, § 2. See also LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTrTUTIONAL LAW, § 3-14, at 108
(2d ed. 1988). The standing doctrine requires that a party who brings a lawsuit have a sufficient
stake in the outcome of the dispute. Id. At a minimum, the party must show:
(1) that he personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the puta-
tively illegal conduct of the defendant, (injury in fact); (2) that the injury fairly can be
traced to the challenged action, (causation); and (3) that the injury is likely to be re-
dressed by a favorable decision (redressability).
Id. (quoting Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and
State, 454 U.S. 464,472 (1982) (citations and footnotes omitted)).
Young, 427 U.S. at 59.
a7 Id. at 60 (quoting Erznoznik v. City ofJacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 216 (1975)).
* 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
"See 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3141-3150 (1998). The Bail Reform Act allows federal courts to detain
arrestees without bail, pending trial, if the government demonstrates by clear and convincing
evidence that no release conditions can reasonably assure the safety of any other person. Id. §
3142(e). The defendants mounted a facial challenge to the Act on the grounds that it violated
their Fifth Amendment right to substantive due process. See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 746.
Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745 (emphasis added).
1246 MAUREENL. RURKA [Vol. 89
of circumstances exists under which the [a] ct would be valid,"7 '
or whether to apply a less stringent standard to the challenger-
as the Court does in First Amendment cases-in which the chal-
lenger must show that the statute's chilling effect on constitu-
tionally protected conduct is "real and substantial"72 and is not
"readily subject to a narrowing construction by the state
courts."78  In either event, the standard for a facial challenge is
difficult to surmount, as it should be.74
Traditionally, the Court has applied the Salerno standard in
striking down facial challenges to abortion statutes.75 However,
at least one lower court has held that the Court's decision in
Planned Parenthood v. Casy7 6 replaced the Salerno standard in
abortion cases with a test of whether "in a large fraction of the
cases in which [the law] is relevant, it will operate as a substan-
71Id.
7, Eiznoznik, 422 U.S. at 216.
7Id.
" The reason why such challenges are (and should be) difficult to surmount lies in the Su-
preme Court standing doctrine. See TRIBE, supra note 65, § 12-31 to -32, at 1033-37. Professor
Tribe notes:
The conclusion that a statute is too vague and therefore void as a matter of due process
is ... unlikely to be triggered without two findings: that the individual challenging the
statute is indeed one of the entrapped innocent, and that it would have been practical for
the legislature to draft more precisely.
Id. at 1034 (citations omitted). Professor Tribe goes on to point out that the First Amendment
overbreadth doctrine "is often perceived as an exception to the rule that an individual is not or-
dinarily permitted to litigate the rights of third parties." Id. at 1035. The rationale behind the
exception in these cases is:
that there is not likely to be a better party. Those whose expression is "chilled" by the exis-
tence of an overbroad or unduly vague statute cannot be expected to adjudicate their own
rights, lacking by definition the willingness to disobey the law. In addition, such deterred
persons may not have standing ... since the hypothetical "chilling effect" of the mere exis-
tence of an overbroad or vague law does not by itself constitute the sort of "injury-in-fact"
which confers standing.
Id. However, "some nexus is nevertheless required." Id. at 1036. Furthermore, "one to whose
conduct a statute clearly applies may not challenge it on the basis that it is 'vague as applied' to
others." Id.
"See, e.g., H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 406-07 (1981) (applying Salerno standard in strik-
ing down facial challenge to statute requiring parental notification for minor seeking abortion).
See also Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490, 524 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring) (citing Salerno in striking down a facial challenge to a Missouri statute which banned the
use of public employees and facilities for the performance of abortions).
"505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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tial obstacle to a woman's choice to undergo an abortion."7
The Supreme Court has yet to resolve the debate.7 8
B. A CTUS REUS
Determining the appropriate standard for a facial challenge
to a statute does little to illuminate how specific the statutory
language must be. Indeed, the Court has never explicitly
adopted a test for vagueness; however, the Court has generally
recognized that language is inherently ambiguous and impre-
cise, and has allowed for leeway in statutory language consistent
with this recognition. 9 For example, in Smith v. Goguen,s° the
Court struck down a Massachusetts statute that made it a crime
to "treat contemptuously" the flag of the United States. 81 The
Court reasoned that the phrase "treats contemptuously" was "of
such a standardless sweep" that it allowed "policemen, prosecu-
tors, and juries to pursue their personal predilections. 82 Justice
White wrote a concurring opinion in which he implicitly
adopted a "core and penumbra" analysis83 in determining that
the statute itself was not unconstitutionally vague.8 4 He wrote:
It is self-evident that there is a whole range of conduct that anyone
with at least a semblance of common sense would know is contemptuous
conduct and that would be covered by the statute if directed at the flag.
In these instances, there would be ample notice to the actor and no
room for undue discretion by enforcement officers. There may be a va-
riety of other conduct that might or might not be claimed contemptuous
by the State, but unpredictability in those situations does not change the
certainty in 
others.
" Planned Parenthood v. Miller, 63 F.3d 1452, 1457 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting Casey, 505 U.S.
at 895).
'"See id.
See, e.g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110 (1972) ("Condemned to the use of
words, we can never expect mathematical certainty from our language.").
415 U.S. 566 (1974).
,'Id. at 582. The defendant was arrested for sewing a likeness of the flag on the seat of his
pants. Id at 568.
Id. at 575.
See H.LA Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 90 (1958).
Professor Hart asserts that words have both a clearly recognizable core meaning and "a penum-
bra of debatable cases in which words are neither obviously applicable nor obviously ruled out."
Id.
Goguen, 415 U.S. at 584 (White,J., concurring) (arguing that the statute was not unconsti-
tutionally vague, but violated the FirstAmendment on its face).
"Id. (White,J, concurring).
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This "core and penumbra" theory, exemplified by Justice
White's concurrence in Goguen, seems to underlie many of the
Court's vagueness decisions." The result, in part, has been a
general standard of reasonableness: a statute is unconstitution-
ally vague if it "fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence a
reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited."87
The primary concern of the courts is the precision of the ac-
tus reus element of the criminal statute.s For example, in Pa-
pachristou v. City ofJacksonville,9 the Court invalidated a vagrancy
ordinance that made it a crime to be, among other things: a
"rogue," a "vagabond," a "dissolute person who goes about beg-
ging," a "common gambler," a "habitual loafer," or a "person
wandering or strolling around from place to place without any
lawful purpose or object."90 The Court held that the statute was
vague on its face, because it only criminalized possible future
conduct, not past conduct.91
Similarly, in Lanzetta v. New Jersey,2 the Court invalidated a
NewJersey statute that made it a crime to be a "gangster."93 The
statute defined "gangster" as: "[a] ny person not engaged in any
lawful occupation, known to be a member of any gang consist-
ing of two or more persons, who has been convicted at least
three times of being a disorderly person ....,, The Court rea-
soned that there was no limitation whatsoever on the term
"gang," and that it could be both over-inclusive and under-
inclusive in its application.95
See, e.g., United States v. Wurtzbach, 280 U.S. 396, 399 (1930) ("Whenever the law draws a
line there will be cases very near each other on opposite sides. The precise course of the line
may be uncertain, but no one can come near it without knowing that he does so ... and if he
does so it is familiar to the criminal law to make him take the risk."). See also, Collings, supra
note 42, at 206 ("[TIhe presence of difficult borderline or peripheral cases will not invalidate a
statute at least where there is a hard core of circumstances to which the statute unquestionably
applies ... .").
,Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).
"See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
405 U.S. 156 (1972).
Id. at 156-57 n.1.
Id. at 171.
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Finally, in City of Chicago v. Morales,9 a Supreme Court deci-
sion handed down just last year, the Court invalidated a Chicago
ordinance that prohibited loitering in any public place by two
or more people, at least one of whom was known by the police
officer to be a "criminal street gang member."9 7 The city argued
that the ordinance was not void for vagueness because the po-
lice were required to order the alleged loiterers to disperse and
the alleged loiterers had to ignore the order before the ordi-
nance was violated. Thus, said the city, the alleged loiterers
would have adequate notice that their conduct was illegal.98 The
Court rejected this argument, for two reasons. First, the Court
concluded that, since the ordinance was aimed at loitering, and
the loitering was harmless, the dispersal order itself could be
unconstitutional. The ordinance would not protect the alleged
loiterer from the order of dispersal.'9 Second, the Court rea-
soned that the terms of the dispersal order could compound the
vagueness problem of the ordinance by failing to specify what
the alleged loiterers would be required to do in order to avoid
violating the dispersal order.'00 In other words, the lack of clar-
ity in the ordinance's definition of the forbidden conduct exac-
erbated the problem of what the scope of the alleged loiterer's
duty should be upon receiving a dispersal order.01
The problem with these and other similarly worded va-
grancy statutes is that they do not criminalize any act at all.
Rather, they tend to criminalize a person's "status," or worse,
what a law enforcement officer believes a person's status to be.02
119 S. Ct. 1849 (1999).
"Id. at 1854.




0 See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). In Robinson, the Supreme Court struck
down as unconstitutional a statute that made addiction to narcotics a criminal offense. Id. at
666-67. The Court reasoned that punishing someone for his status as an addict rather than for
conduct, such as using narcotics, constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments. Id.
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In this way, they allow for too much discretion on the part of po-
103lice officers and other law enforcement agencies.
On the other end of the spectrum are statutes that are "me-
chanical" in their application. For example, in Spence v. Wash-
ington,14 the Court, in dicta, rejected the defendant's void-for-
vagueness argument applied to a flag-desecration statute which
made it criminal to "place or cause to be placed any word, fig-
ure, mark, picture, design, drawing or advertisement.., upon
any flag... of the United States .... ."'0 The Court reasoned:
The statute's application is quite mechanical .... The law in Washing-
ton, simply put, is that nothing may be affixed to or superimposed on a
United States flag or a representation thereof. Thus, if selective en-
forcement has occurred, it has been a result of prosecutorial discretion,
not the language of the statute. Accordingly, this case is unlike Smith v.
Goguen ... where the words of the statute at issue ("publicly... treats
contemptuously") were themselves sufficiently indefinite to prompt sub-
jective treatment by prosecutorial authorities.
Many vagueness challenges, however, are mounted against
statutes that fall somewhere in between the extremes of the me-
chanical statute at issue in Spence and the broadly worded va-
grancy statutes that punish status rather than conduct.
Generally, the statutes have some mechanical elements com-
bined with terms that allow for varying degrees of discretion on
the part of law enforcement officials.
For example, the Court in Grayned v. City of Rockfordc
0 7 up-
held an anti-noise ordinance that made it a crime for any per-
son adjacent to a school building to make any noise that
disturbed or tended to disturb a class in session."' Although the
words of the ordinance were "marked by 'flexibility and reason-
able breadth, rather than meticulous specificity,"' the Court that
... See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983) (noting that the more important aspect
of vagueness doctrine is the problem of arbitrary enforcement, not the problem of fair warning
to the potential offender).
' 418 U.S. 405 (1974).
Id. at 407, 415 n.9.
"'Id. at 415 n.9 (discussing Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974)). See also supra notes 80-
85 and accompanying text. The Court in Spence held that the statute was unconstitutional be-
cause it violated the First Amendment. Spence, 418 U.S. at 414.
'408 U.S. 104 (1972).
' Id. at 107-08, 121.
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the ordinance was clear in what conduct it prohibited.1' 9 The
Court reasoned that the ordinance fixed the time and the place
and provided a measurable factor for when the ordinance was
violated; that is, whether normal school activity had been or was
about to be disrupted.1
Grayned demonstrates that ambiguous or vague language in
a statute can be clarified by an objectively measurable factor.
This factor can be contained within the statute, as it was in
Grayned, or can be external to the statute. In Connally v. General
Construction Co.,"' the Court listed the ways in which a statute
may be clarified, as follows:
[The statutes] employ[] words or phrases having a technical or other
special meaning, well enough known to enable those within their reach
to correctly apply to them . . .or a well-settled common-law meaning,
notwithstanding an element of degree in the definition as to which esti-
mates might differ,... or... for reasons found to result either from the
text of the statutes involved or the subjects with which they dealt, a stan-
dard of some sort was afforded.1
1 2
In Omaechevarria v. Idaho,"3 the Court upheld a statute that
made it a crime to graze sheep on ranges previously occupied by
cattle, rejecting the argument that the term "range" was overly
vague because it failed to specify the boundaries of the range."
4
The Court reasoned: "men familiar with range conditions and
desirous of observing the law will have little difficulty in deter-
mining what is prohibited by it.""5
Similarly, in Hygrade Provision Co. v. Sherman,n6 the Court
upheld a statute that prescribed criminal penalties for anyone
who, with intent to defraud, sold any meat or other product
falsely represented as kosher or as having been sanctioned by
the orthodox Hebrew religious requirements." 7 The challeng-
ers of the statute argued that the terms "kosher" and "orthodox
" Id. at 110 (quoting Esteban v. Central Missouri State College, 415 F.2d 1077, 1088 (8th
Cir. 1969)).
" Id. at 112.
.. 269 U.S. 385 (1926).
"' Id. at 391-92 (citations omitted).
246 U.S. 343 (1918).
' Id. at 348.
"1 Id.
266 U.S. 497 (1925).
"' Id. at 498.
MA UREENL. RURKA
Hebrew religious requirements" were very difficult to determine
with any certainty, and that the statute was, therefore, unconsti-
tutional. 8 The Court rejected this argument, reasoning, inter
alia, that "the evidence, while conflicting, warrants the conclu-
sion that the term 'kosher' has a meaning well enough defined
to enable one engaged in the trade to correctly apply it .... ,,
Based on the foregoing, it appears that courts will generally
require the actus reus elements of the partial-birth abortion bans
to contain fairly mechanical language, but will allow a great deal
of flexibility in the language provided the external context-for
example, the generally accepted meaning in the medical field
of the phrase "partial-birth abortion"-adequately narrows the
scope of the bans to only "partial-birth abortions."
C. MENS REA
Sometimes, if the challenged statute fails to provide a suffi-
ciently precise actus reus element, the statute's defect can be
cured by a mens rea or "scienter" requirement.120 For example,
in Adderley v. Florida,"2' the Court upheld the arrest of a group of
protestors demonstrating at a county jail who were convicted of
violating a trespass statute. 22 The statute prescribed criminal
penalties for trespass committed with malicious or mischievous
intent.12 The Court rejected the defendants' argument that the
phrase "malicious and mischievous intent" was vague and over-
broad, asserting that this phrase actually narrowed the scope of
the offense, rather than broadening it, and made its meaning
more understandable and clear. 124 The Court offered very little
reasoning for this analysis, merely pointing to the jury instruc-
tions given by the trial court for the terms "malicious" and "mis-
chievous."1' The trial court had defined the term "malicious" as
"done knowingly and willfully and without any legal justifica-
",Id. at 499-500.
"'Id. at 502.
,"See The Void-For-Vagueness Docttine in the Supreme Court, supra note 7, at 87 n.98. See also su-
pra note 9 and accompanying text.
'. 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
' Id. at 40, 48.
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tion,"' 26 and "mischievous" as "inclined to cause petty and trivial
trouble, annoyance and vexation to others."
It is difficult to see, however, how these definitions clarify
the trespass statute. First, the definition of the term "mischie-
vous," standing alone, could easily be read as broadening the
statute. Like the ordinance at issue in Coates,'28 the "violation
may entirely depend upon whether or not a policeman is an-
noyed."'9 The word itself does nothing to clarify what consti-
tutes a trespass under the Florida statute.
Second, and more important, the definition of the term
"malicious" merely makes the alleged clarity of the statute circu-
lar. In other words, one of the main problems with a vague
statute is that it fails to give notice to a potential violator of that
statute which acts are proscribed and will thus subject her to
criminal liability. Such a person, who is complaining that she
had no notice that her conduct was unlawful, will not be per-
suaded that the statute provided the notice simply because the
statute requires that the act be done "knowingly and willfully
and without any legal justification.' ' ° She would be required to
know that the act had no legal justification (i.e., that the act was
against the law), which is exactly what she is claiming she did not
know because of the vague statutory language. 1
Despite these difficulties, the Court continues to accept the
line of reasoning in vagueness cases that a scienter requirement
in a statute can sometimes clarify an ambiguity in the actus reus
element of the statutory language.3 2 This tendency can perhaps
be adequately explained in the context of arbitrary enforce-
" Id. at 43 n.2.
12Id.
402 U.S. 611 (1971). See also supra notes 54-61 and accompanying text.
"'402 U.S. at 614.
"'Adderey, 385 U.S. at 43 n.2.
See The Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, supra note 7, at 87 n.98. See also
Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 153-54 (1945) (Roberts, J., dissenting) (reasoning that the
existence of a mens tea requirement does nothing to cure a vague statute).
"' See The Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, supra note 7, at 87 n.98 (listing cases
in which the Supreme Court accepted the reasoning that vagueness in a statute was cured by a
scienter requirement).
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ment, rather than in adequate notice.33 It is more difficult to
convict someone of violating a law if the prosecutor must estab-
lish intent to do the act that the law proscribes.' This addi-
tional obstacle could effectively weed out those cases in which a
person inadvertently violates the law without the requisite in-
tent.1
3
Based on the foregoing, one would expect that a partial-
birth abortion ban that contains a scienter requirement would
be even less susceptible to a vagueness or overbreadth challenge
than a ban without a scienter requirement. However, the case
law on the partial-birth abortion bans does not bear this expec-
tation out.
3 6
D. SUMMARY OF THE VOID-FOR-VAGUENESS DOCTRINE
The Supreme Court's silence on the issue of facial chal-
lenges to abortion statutes raises interesting possibilities in the
area of the partial-birth abortion bans. If the Salerno standard
applies-as it ostensibly does for every area of case law outside
the context of the First Amendment-then the Supreme Court
would certainly uphold the partial-birth abortion bans against
these facial challenges; the only issue to address would be
whether "no set of circumstances exist under which the [a]ct
would be valid.' 37 Under Planned Parenthood v. Casey,' the bans
are valid if they do not place an undue burden on a woman's
right to choose.' 9 Thus, under the Salerno standard, a potential
challenger probably would not have standing to challenge the
bans.
If the First Amendment standard applies, the challenger will
be required to show that the chilling effect of the statute on the
performance of abortions is "real and substantial" and not
'" See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 983 F.2d 757, 765 (7th Cir. 1993) (implying that a scien-
ter requirement in a criminal statute requires the government to prove knowledge or intent,
making the prosecutor's job more difficult and the statute more fair).
IM I&L
Id.
See infra Part V.B.
" United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987).
505 U.S. 833 (1992).
' Id. at 895.
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"readily subject to a narrowing construction by state courts."'40
Whether the bans are readily subject to a narrowing construc-
tion depends, for the most part, on the vagueness of the statu-
tory language.
A general principle which can be derived from these void-
for-vagueness cases is that courts will allow a certain amount of
vagueness or ambiguity in the actus reus portion of the statutory
language, as long as the language or the external context of the
statute provides an adequate objective standard for determining
when the statute has been violated. In other words, a court
generally will not hold as void-for-vagueness a statute with me-
chanical terms which are easy to apply to concrete situations,
combined with terms which are more vague or susceptible to
varying interpretations, especially when the vague terms can be
narrowed in scope by external context. Moreover, if the statute
contains a mens rea requirement, it should be further insulated
from being thrown out on void-for-vagueness grounds, al-
though, as stated earlier, the reason for this remains unclear.
One reason (among many) underlying the principle that
some vagueness is allowed, is the well-established doctrine of
lenity, which requires a court to construe a state criminal statute
as narrowly as possible to avoid declaring the statute unconstitu-
tional.141 In fact, state statutes enjoy a presumption of constitu-
tionality, in deference to concerns about the proper role the
federal government should play in determining state criminal
laws. Thus, courts should be, and in most cases are, reluctant
to hold state statutes void for vagueness, unless the statute con-
tains virtually no measurable standard to determine when the
statute has been violated.
, Erznoznik v. City ofJacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 216 (1975).
"' See Planned Parenthood of Wisconsin v. Doyle, 9 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1042 (W.D. Wis. 1998),
aff'd sub no=. The Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 195 F.3d 857 (7th Cir. 1999).
" SeeRichmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Gilmore, 144 F.3d 326,332 (4th Cir. 1998).
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IV. THE PARTIAL-BIRTH ABORTION BANS
A. THE PLAIN MEANING OF THE STATUTORY LANGUAGE
All of the partial-birth abortion statutes, except the Ohio,
Missouri, and North Dakota statutes, employ the phrase "partial-
birth abortion" to describe the proscribed procedure.' Nearly
all of the bans also define the term "partial-birth abortion" as a
procedure in which the physician partially vaginally delivers a
living fetus-or "unborn child" as it is phrased in the Wisconsin
statutel 4-before killing the fetus and completing the deliv-
ery.'4 According to the opponents of the bans, such statutory
language contains several potential problems.
First, the term "partial-birth abortion" is not a technical
medical term.4 6 Opponents of the ban claim that this leaves the
phrase susceptible to varying interpretations as to what medical
procedure the statute proscribes.14 7 This argument will be ad-
dressed in Part IV.B.
Second, opponents contend that the statutory definition of
the term "partial-birth abortion" as "partially vaginally delivers a
148living fetus" does little to clear up the vagueness. For exam-
ple, some Courts have accepted the argument that the phrase
"partially vaginally delivers a living fetus" is ambiguous because
it could mean either of two things: (1) a partial delivery of an
intact fetus, or (2) a delivery of part of a dismembered fetus.
149
The first interpretation is the exact procedure at which these
bans are aimed. However, under the second interpretation, the
statute could arguably apply to an abortion provider performing
a conventional dilation and evacuation (D&E) procedure.'5
In a conventional D&E, the fetus is dismembered inside the
uterine cavity, then removed piece by piece. According to some
"'See supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text.
'"SeeWIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.16 (West Supp. 1999).
"'See supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text.
"' See Evans v. Kelley, 977 F. Supp 1283, 1305 (E.D. Mich. 1997).
" See id.
"'SeeEvans, 977 F. Supp. at 1305.
"'See, e.g., The Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 995 F. Supp. 847, 854 (N.D. IMI. 1998), reu'd, 195 F.3d
857 (7th Cir. 1999).
" SeeEvans, 977 F. Supp. at 1306.
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opponents of the bans, an abortion provider who is performing
a conventional D&E "delivers" dismembered parts of the fetus
through the cervical opening.151 If the fetus is still "living" inside
the uterine cavity (i.e., the heart is still beating) when the abor-
tion provider "delivers" a dismembered leg for example, he
could be convicted of violating the statute.152
The flaw in this argument is that the term "partially" is an
adverb, modifying the verb "delivers," not an adjective modify-
ing the noun "fetus." Thus, the statute could not reasonably be
read as including among its prohibitions the delivery of a dis-
membered part of a fetus. Rather, the most reasonable inter-
pretation is that the statute only refers to the partial delivery of
an intact fetus. 5
If one accepts the argument that the fetus must be intact,
the issue then concerns how much of an intact fetus must be de-
livered before the statute is triggered. Several doctors in the
partial-birth abortion ban cases testified that, in the process of
performing a conventional D&E, various parts of an intact living
fetus might inadvertently protrude from the cervical opening.1
4
Moreover, one doctor testified that, in performing a conven-
tional D&E, he often pulls the leg of the fetus through the cer-
vical opening in order to provide "counter-traction" of the
cervical opening to facilitate dismemberment of the fetus. 5
Several states have attempted to solve this problem by fur-
ther defining "partially vaginally delivers" as "deliberately and
intentionally delivers into the vagina a living fetus, or a substan-
tial portion thereof."'5 6  Opponents claim, however, that this
language does little to ameliorate the vagueness, asserting that
the bans contain no clear statutory definition of what constitutes
13 See id.
'See id.
Underlying this argument is a general presumption that the word "fetus" refers to an in-
tact fetus unless the language explicitly states otherwise. The use of the word "partially" does
not rebut this presumption because "partially" modifies not "fetus" but rather "delivers."
See id. at 1298.
'"See Carhart v. Stenberg, 11 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1104 (D. Neb. 1998), aff'd 192 F.3d 1142
(8th Cir. 1999). As stated earlier, the Supreme Court agreed, in January 2000, to review the Ne-
braska statute. See Greenburg, supra note 5, at Al.
" See supra note S0 and accompanying text.
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a "substantial portion."17 At least one court-the District Court
of Nebraska in Carhart v. Stenberg-has accepted the argument
that a leg or an arm could qualify as a substantial portion.58
However, Webster's Dictionary defines the term "substantial" as
"relatively great in size," 159 indicating that a "substantial portion"
should mean at least more than half of the fetus' body. A leg of
a fetus, for example, is not "great in size" relative to the remain-
der of the fetus.' 6°
Another way to alleviate the difficulty of determining how
much of the intact fetus must be "delivered" in order to trigger
the statute is to add a scienter requirement to the statute, which
the majority of the states have done. 6 ' As stated in Part III.C, it
is somewhat difficult to see how a scienter requirement clears
up ambiguous statutory language, 62 but it may provide an addi-
tional method for weeding out those borderline cases that could




In other words, if an abortion provider does not intend to par-
tially vaginally deliver a living fetus before killing the fetus, but a
small portion of the intact fetus inadvertently protrudes from
the cervical opening, he cannot be convicted of violating the
statute.
The district court in Carhart, however, rejected the argu-
ment that the scienter requirement alleviated the vagueness or
... See Carhar4, 11 F. Supp. at 1129.
8Id.
"9 NEwWEBsTER's DICrIONARY 427 (Grolier, Inc. 1992).
" One may quibble over whether the fetus" body is the correct relative measure to compare
to the fetus' leg but, as this comment will demonstrate in Part IV.B, it is not necessary to go into
such detail. See infra Part W.B. Moreover, it is difficult to see how anything other than the fetus'
entire body could be the correct relative measure.
This interpretation of the phrase "substantial portion" also squares with what is arguably the
underlying purpose of the statute: that is, the prevention of infanticide. See, e.g., 1999 Mo. Legis.
Serv. 427 (West). See also supra note 28. The notion here is that the state's interest in the ongo-
ing life of the fetus is fully realized when the fetus is completely delivered from the mother's
womb. Conversely, at that point the mother's interest in her body as it relates to the fetus's life
is extinguished. The partial-birth abortion bans, therefore, can arguably be viewed as the state's
attempt to draw the line between abortion and infanticide.
,' See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text. Only Louisiana, Michigan, and South Da-
kota have not included a scienter requirement in the statutes. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:32.9
(West Supp. 1998); MICH. COMp. LAWS § 333.17016 (West Supp. 1999); S.D. CODIFIED LAws §
34-23A-27, -32 (Michie Supp. 1998).
See supra Part III.C.
See supra notes 126-28 and accompanying text.
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overbreadth of the statute, because the abortion provider in
that case testified that he intended to extract the intact fetus'
leg from the uterine cavity in order to facilitate dismember-
ment.'6 The Nebraska statute at issue in Carhart also contained
the "substantial portion" language.'1 Thus, the court could
have, and should have, held that this language by itself was suf-
ficient to remove any vagueness or overbreadth problem in the
statute. But even those statutes in the second and third cate-
gory, which do not employ the "substantial portion" language,
are not void for vagueness; the context of the statutes amelio-
rates any issue of vagueness and overbreadth.
B. THE CONTEXT OF THE STATUTES
Despite the dubious claims of some physicians that they do
not know what constitutes a "partial-birth abortion,"'l the medi-
cal literature indicates a common understanding of the term to
mean a dilation and extraction (D&X) procedure.1 67 For exam-
ple, in hearings conducted pursuant to the federal bill, the
president of the National Coalition of Abortion Providers, the
president of Planned Parenthood Federation of America, and
the president of the National Abortion Rights Action League all
identified the ban on partial-birth abortions as a ban on the
D&X procedure.16t Moreover, the American College of Obste-
tricians and Gynecologists (ACOG) issued a statement of policy
onJanuary 12, 1997, which stated:
The debate regarding legislation to prohibit a method of abortion, such
as the legislation banning "partial-birth abortion" and "brain sucking
abortions," has prompted questions regarding these procedures....
"Carhart 11 F. Supp. 2d at 1128-29.
"'See NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-326(9) (Michie 1997).
"6 See, e.g., Evans v. Kelley, 977 F. Supp. 1283, 1297-1301 (E.D. Mich 1997) (summarizing tes-
timony of abortion-providing doctors that indicated their confusion as to the definition of "par-
tial-birth abortion").
"' See e.g., Sprang & Neerhof, supra note 10, at 744. See also Grimes, supra note 21, at 749
(discussing federal and state legislators' attempts to ban the D&X procedure). These articles
and others were published in the Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA), which
has a weekly circulation to over 365,000 physicians in over 50 specialties. See Ammican Medical
Association (visited October 8, 1999) ¢http//pubs.ama-assn.org/howslassad.html>; see also Gans
Epner, supra note 12.
' See Partial-Birth Abortion: The Truth: Joint Hearing Before the Senate Comm on the Judiciay and
the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciay, 105th Cong. 17-21, 23-25
(1997).
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The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (AGOG) be-
lieves the intent of such legislative proposals is to prohibit a procedure
referred to as "Intact Dilatation and Extraction" (Intact 
D&X).
Interestingly, the first statute to utilize the phrase "dilation
and extraction" rather than the phrase "partial-birth abortion"
in referring to the procedure which the legislature intended to
prohibit-and the only such statute examined by a federal
court-was also declared unconstitutionally vague and was per-
manently enjoined.17 ° This Ohio statute defined the dilation
and extraction procedure as "the termination of a human preg-
nancy by purposely inserting a suction device into the skull of a
fetus to remove the brain." 171 The Sixth Circuit held that this
definition could also be applied to the D&E procedure in those
circumstances when the dismembered skull of the fetus was too
large to pass through the cervical opening and required com-
pression accomplished through the suctioning of the intracra-
nial contents, and thus it was void for vagueness. 72 Ironically,
the court stated in dicta that the proposed federal legislation,173
which employed the phrase "partial-birth abortion," appeared
to come closer to describing the D&X procedure. 7 4
The Ohio legislature could have made the statute less vague
by including all of the elements listed by the AGOG as constitut-
ing a D&X procedure. 175 But, in Planned Parenthood v. Doyle,7
the district court highlighted the problems inherent in listing
" American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists Statement of Policy as Issued by the
AGOG Executive Board: Statement on Intact Dilatation and Extraction (Jan. 12, 1997) (unpub-
lished policy statement, on file with author). AGOG defined the D&X procedure as consisting
of four elements: (1) deliberate dilation of the cervix, usually over a sequence of days; (2) in-
strumental conversion of the fetus to a footling breech; (3) breech extraction of the body except
the head; and (4) partial evacuation of the intracranial contents of a living fetus to effect vaginal
delivery of a dead but otherwise intact fetus. Id. See also supra note 11.
'" SeeWomen's Med. Prof. Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187, 200 (6th Cir. 1997), cerL denied
118 S. Ct. 1347 (1998).
.. OHIO REV. CODEANN. § 2919.15 (West 1996).
Women's Med. Prof. Corp., 130 F.3d at 199.
"'H.R. 1122, 105th Cong. § 2 (1997).
1 Women's Med. Prof Corp., 130 F.3d at 199 n.9.
'The Kansas legislature attempted to alleviate the vagueness and overbreadth problems by
listing which procedures are not included within the scope of the statute, in particular the D&E
procedure. See 1998 Kan. Sess. Laws 142.
7' 9 F. Supp. 2d 1033 (W.D. Wis. 1998), affid sub nam. The Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 195 F.3d 857
(7th Cir. 1999).
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all of the elements.'77 For example, if the fetus were already in a
breech presentation, the statute would not apply.7 8 Moreover,
an abortion provider could utilize a means of killing the fetus
other than suctioning the intracranial contents.'7 Finally, an
abortion provider could partially remove a fetus from the
uterus, but not "everything except the head," without techni-
cally violating the statute.'8s These examples demonstrate the
problem facing any legislature attempting to draft any criminal
legislation: the dilemma of drafting a statute either susceptible
to the claim that it is too vague to be constitutional, or so spe-
cific that it provides loopholes for those whom the legislature
intends to prosecute.
The Utah legislature attempted to strike the balance by util-
izing both "partial birth abortion" and "dilation and extraction"
to describe the procedure being banned.'8' In addition, the
Utah legislature added the word "intact"C in describing the fetus
to be delivered.' 2 This statute is not susceptible to the criticism
that it could be applied to the removal of part of a dismem-
bered fetus, since the statute requires that the fetus be intact.
Moreover, it employs both the "partial birth" language and the
more medically accepted "dilation and extraction" language,
which helps to alleviate any alleged confusion in the medical
community. However, the use of the word "intact" in describing
the fetus does provide a substantial loophole for abortion pro-
viders who wish to perform D&Xs without technically violating
the statute. Such an abortion provider could simply remove a
toe of the fetus before performing the procedure, thereby re-
moving himself from the purview of the statute. Even without
this loophole, the Utah legislature's arguable success at drafting
a statute that is less susceptible to a vagueness attack, does not
render the remaining statutes unconstitutionally vague. 8 3
'7 See id. at 1042.
'7 .See id.
" See id. Note that this observation creates problems for the Ohio and Kansas statutes as
well.
1w See id.
n. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-310.5 (Supp. 1998).
1 Id.
" The same can be said for the Missouri and North Dakota bans. See supra note 28. They
are arguably less vague than most of the other bans, in that the language is very mechanical. But
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As Part V will show, by utilizing the phrase "partial-birth
abortion"-with the common understanding that a partial-birth
abortion is a D&X procedure-and defining it as an abortion in
which one "partially vaginally delivers a living fetus before kill-
ing the fetus," the remaining state legislatures were able to ade-
quately limit the scope of the statute to only those physicians
performing D&X procedures.
V. THE DOCTRINE AS APPLIED TO PARTIAL-BIRTH ABORTION
A. STANDING TO RAISE AN OVERBREADTH CHALLENGE
Clearly, the partial-birth abortion bans fall under the line
of "spurious" cases-cases in which the statutory language, if
vague, will cause a problem of overbreadth. In other words, if
these bans are overly vague, they could impermissibly prohibit
constitutionally protected conduct (performing D&Es), or, at
the very least, could chill abortion providers from performing
D&Es out of fear of prosecution. Because these bans are being
challenged facially and not as applied by a particular state, the
initial issue is whether the potential chilling effect is sufficiently
imminent to justify a court striking down the bans on facial
challenges. This issue is sometimes addressed as a standing is-
185sue.
The bans unquestionably apply to those abortion providers
who perform D&Xs. Thus, these abortion providers have stand-
ing to mount a facial challenge to the constitutionality of the
statutes on grounds other than the alleged vagueness and result-
ing overbreadth of the statutes. However, as the Supreme Court
held in Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc.,86 they do not have
the standing to assert the rights of abortion providers who do
not perform D&Xs, unless (at the very least) the statutes' chill-
ing effect on those third parties is "both real and substantial,"
they still provide substantial loopholes, and, in any event, do not, simply by virtue of their exis-
tence, render the remaining statutes void for vagueness.
" See supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text.
" See, e.g., Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 618 (1971) (White, J. dissenting). See
also supra notes 59-65 and accompanying text.
'" 427 U.S. 50 (1976). See also supra notes 62-67 and accompanying text.
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and is not "readily subject to a narrowing construction by the
state courts."18 7
Abortion-providers who do not perform D&Xs also face the
standing problem in mounting a facial overbreadth challenge to
the statutes. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that it
does not recognize an overbreadth doctrine outside the limited
'" 427 U.S. at 59. This is typically the less stringent standard applied in the absence of the
Salemo standard. In some states, such as Indiana, Mississippi, South Dakota, Tennessee, and
Virginia, where the bans are currently in effect, empirical evidence indicates that the challeng-
ers' asserted fears that the bans will have a chilling effect on abortion providers performing any
abortion procedures has not been borne out. See Indiana State Department of Health, Termi-
nated Pregnancies by Procedure and Month, 1996 (Aug. 18, 1999) (unpublished tables, on file
with author); Indiana State Department of Health, Terminated Pregnancies by Procedure and
Month, 1997 (Aug. 18, 1999) (unpublished tables, on file with author); Mississippi State De-
partment of Health, Induced Terminations Performed in Mississippi in 1996 by Primary Proce-
dure and Month Termination was Done (Aug. 23, 1999) (unpublished tables, on file with
author); Mississippi State Department of Health, Induced Terminations Performed in Missis-
sippi in 1997 by Primary Procedure and Month Termination was Done (Aug. 23, 1999) (unpub-
lished tables, on file with author); South Dakota Department of Health, Induced Abortions
Occurring in South Dakota by Month of Abortion and Type of Procedure, 1996 (Aug. 26, 1999)
(unpublished tables, on file with author); South Dakota Department of Health, South Dakota
Vital Statistics and Health Status, 1996 (Aug. 26, 1999) (on file with author); South Dakota De-
partment of Health, South Dakota Vital Statistics and Health Status, 1997 (Aug. 26, 1999) (on
file with author); Tennessee Department of Health, Selected Induced Abortion Data According
to Age and Race of Woman, Tennessee and Department of Health Regions, Resident Data, 1996
(Aug. 26, 1999) (unpublished tables, on file with author); Tennessee Department of Health, Se-
lected Induced Abortion Data According to Age and Race of Woman, Tennessee and Depart-
ment of Health Regions, Resident Data, 1997 (Aug. 26, 1999) (unpublished tables, on file with
author); Tennessee Department of Health, 1997 Tennessee Resident Abortions, Table by Month
by Procedure (Aug. 26, 1999) (unpublished tables, on file with author); Virginia Department of
Health, Resident Induced Terminations of Pregnancy, 1996 (Aug. 23, 1999) (unpublished ta-
bles, on file with author); Virginia Department of Health, Resident Induced Terminations of
Pregnancy, 1997 (Aug. 23, 1999) (unpublished tables, on file with author).
For example, in 1996, prior to the enactment of Indiana's partial birth abortion ban, the In-
diana State Department of Health reported that 12,875 Indiana residents terminated a preg-
nancy in Indiana. See supra Indiana State Department of Health, Terminated Pregnancies by
Procedure and Month, 1996. In 1997, that number remained essentially the same, with the In-
diana State Department of Health reporting a drop of only 210 terminations to 12,665. See supra
Indiana State Department of Health, Terminated Pregnancies by Procedure and Month, 1997.
Of these 12,665 abortions, 159 were D&E abortions and 87 of the 159 D&Es (54.7%) were per-
formed in the second half of 1997, while the ban was in effect. See id.
In Mississippi, the total number of reported induced terminations of pregnancy in 1996 was
4206, with the ratio of induced terminations per 1000 live births at 102.6. See supra Mississippi
State Department of Health, Induced Terminations Performed in Mississippi in 1996 by Primary
Procedure and Month Termination was Done. In 1997, the year in which the Mississippi statute
was enacted, the total number of induced terminations increased to 4325, with the ratio of in-
duced terminations per 1000 live births increasing to 104.1. See supra Mississippi State Depart-
ment of Health, Induced Terminations Performed in Mississippi in 1997 by Primary Procedure
and Month Termination was Done. Were these bans to be chilling abortion providers from per-
forming all abortions, one would expect these numbers to drop dramatically. As the evidence
shows, however, this is not the case.
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context of the First Amendment. 8 As stated earlier, the Su-
preme Court has not resolved the issue of whether the Salerno
standard for mounting facial challenges to statutes applies in
the abortion context in light of its decision in Planned Parenthood
v. Casey.' If the Salerno standard applies, then these abortion
providers must show that "no set of circumstances exists under
which the act would be valid." 19° Essentially, this would amount
to requiring the challengers to show that the bans are unconsti-
tutional on grounds other than the overbreadth of the statutory
language.
If the Salerno standard does not apply and the Court adopts
a First Amendment standard, then the abortion providers who
do not perform D&Xs must show that the chilling effect of the
statutes is both real and substantial and is not readily subject to
a narrowing construction by state courts.' In either case, the
facial challenge is difficult to mount, as it logically should be.' 92
Abortion providers who do not perform D&Xs cannot complain
that their rights have been violated unless they have actually
been prosecuted for violating the statutes or the threat of
prosecution is so imminent that they reasonably will not per-
form conventional D&Es out of fear of prosecution.9  As the
next section will show, the partial-birth abortion bans are, in-
deed, readily subject to a narrowing construction.'1 Thus, the
abortion providers who do not perform D&Xs do not have
standing to mount a facial challenge to the partial-birth abor-
tion bans.
B. ACTUS REUS AND MENS REA OF THE PARTIALBIRTH ABORTION
BANS
It bears noting that the bans in all four categories contain
fairly mechanical language. On the spectrum of statutory lan-
guage, the language of the bans more closely resembles the lan-
1S8 See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987).
' 505 U.S. 833 (1992). See supra notes 68-78 and accompanying text.
' Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745.
Young, 427 U.S. at 60. See supra note 187.
"' See supra note 74.
.. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564 (1992) (holding that a party
lacks standing when the injury she is asserting is not imminent or substantially likely to occur).
.. See infa Part V.B.
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guage of the flag-desecration statute at issue in Spence v. Wash-
ington 5 than the vagrancy statutes in Papachristou v. City ofJack-
sonvilleW96 and Lanzetta v. NewJersey.'9 7 The bans do not penalize a
"status" but rather an affirmative act. The prohibited act is laid
out clearly and contains a chronology of events that must occur
before triggering the statute. The fetus must be partially vagi-
nally delivered before the abortion provider kills the fetus and
completes the delivery.
Moreover, the bans do not prohibit an act defined such that
the violation of the statute depends on the subjective prefer-
ences of a law enforcement official, like the ordinance at issue
in Coates v. City of Cincinnati,'98 where the violation of the statute
"may entirely depend upon whether or not a policeman is an-
noyed,"'1' or the flag desecration statute in Smith v. Goguen,'0
which contained "[sitatutory language of such a standardless
sweep [that it] allows policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pur-
sue their personal predilections., 0 ' The language of the bans
contains no subjective terms similar to "treats contemptu-
ously"' 2 or "conduct themselves in a manner annoying to per-
sons passing by.,
203
Finally, as demonstrated in Part IV.A, the language of the
bans is not susceptible to more than one interpretation. The
phrase "partially vaginally delivers a living fetus" cannot logically
be read to mean anything other than partial delivery of an in-
tact fetus. The only allegedly vague terms used are the terms
"partially" (contained in the first three categories of bans)204 and
"substantial portion" (contained in the first category of bans) .205
These terms may arguably present a problem of degree, but cer-
tainly not a problem of ambiguity.
418 U.S. 405 (1974). See also supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
405 U.S. 156 (1971). See also supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
" 306 U.S. 451 (1939). See also supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
'"402 U.S. 611 (1971).
"'Id. at 614. See also supra notes 55-61 and accompanying text.
415 U.S. 566 (1974).
1 Id. at 575. See also supra notes 80-85 and accompanying text.
Goguen, 415 U.S. at 573.
Coates, 402 U.S. at 615.
See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
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This problem of degree can be resolved by looking at the
context of the statutory language, just as the Court did in
Omaechevarria v. Idaho°6 where it upheld the grazing statute by
reasoning that people engaged in the occupation of grazing
sheep should not have difficulty in determining the boundaries
of what constitutes a "range," given their expertise in the area.207
The implication here is that one engaged in a particular occu-
pation subject to regulation by the state is expected to have spe-
cial knowledge of the subject matter being regulated. 8
Thus, the language of the bans taken in context with the
ACOG statement of policy, the common understanding that a
partial-birth abortion refers to a D&X procedure, and the defi-
nition of a D&X procedure, offers state courts the ability to
adopt a narrowing construction of these statutes such that the
only procedure prohibited is the D&X procedure. Even if the
Supreme Court were to hold that the Salerno standard does not
apply to abortion statutes, this narrowing ability is enough to
satisfy the more lenient First Amendment standard for facial
overbreadth challenges. There is no evidence that the threat of
prosecution for performing a D&E is "real and substantial,"
°9
nor is there evidence that the bans are not "readily subject to a
narrowing construction by the state courts."2 0
Even the bans that fall in the third category, and do not
contain a scienter requirement, are sufficiently precise to satisfy
the overbreadth standard. The lack of a scienter requirement
does not, by itself, render a statute void-for-vagueness. 211 Rather,
246 U.S. 343 (1918).
Id. at 348. See also supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
The Seventh Circuit, in The Hope Clinic v. Ryan, adopted this line of reasoning in uphold-
ing the Illinois and Wisconsin statutes. 195 F.3d 857, 865 (7th Cir. Oct. 26, 1999). Judge
Easterbrook, for the majority, wrote: "[W]e think that the Supreme Courts of Illinois and Wis-
consin could read their laws in ways that comport with the Constitution. One means of doing
this would be to assimilate the statutory definitions to the medical definition of the D&X .... "
Id. Responding to the criticism that this would amount to rewriting rather than reinterpreting
at statute-a judicial act that is (arguably) forbidden, at least when a federal court is construing
a state statute that has not yet been construed by a state court-Judge Easterbrook remarked:
"Using a medical definition to supplement a vague lay definition does not strike us as revision-
ism or an exercise in deconstruction. But if this approach would nonetheless be an example of
brute force used to save a statute-well, courts do it all the time." Id
'Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 59 (1976). See also supra note 187.
21O Young, 427 U.S. at 59. See also supra note 187.
"' See Voinovich v. Women's Medical Professional Corp., cert. denie, 118 S. Ct. 1347 (1998).
Justice Thomas, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, dissented in the Court's
1266 [Vol. 89
1999] THE VAGUENESS OF PARTIAL-BIRTHABORTION BANS 1267
it compounds the problem for an already vague statute, 12 while
the existence of a scienter requirement may cure an otherwise
213vague statute.
VI. CONCLUSION
A court's decision in any vagueness case probably reflects, to
an extent, its views on the constitutionality of the statute irre-
spective of the alleged vagueness. Thus, in a First Amendment
case, a court may more strictly scrutinize the vagueness chal-
lenge than it might in a economic substantive due process case,
because free speech is currently the "sanctum sanctorum" of the
Supreme Court.1 4 There are early indications that the Supreme
Court will treat statutes regulating abortions as strictly as it treats
First Amendment cases, as evidenced by the Court's decision in
Planned Parenthood v. Casey,2 5 and a subsequent lower court deci-
sion interpreting Casey as requiring a stricter standard of scru-
216tiny in abortion cases.
Several federal courts have implicitly adopted the position
that abortion cases alleging vagueness and overbreadth are to
be treated as rigorously as First Amendment cases are treated. 7
However, the depth of scrutiny these courts have engaged in is
denial of the petition for writ of certiorari to determine the constitutionality of Ohio's partial-
birth abortion ban, writing:
We have never held that, in the abortion context, a scienter requirement is mandated by
the Constitution. To the contrary, in Colautti [v. Franklin] ... we explicitly declined to ad-
dress whether "under a properly drafted statute ... some ... type of scienter would be re-
quired before a physician could be held criminally responsible" ... . We only stated that
the vagueness of the statute at issue was "compounded" by the fact that it lacked a scienter
requirement.
Id. at 1349 (quoting Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379,396 (1979)) (Thomas,J, dissenting).
See, e.g., Young, 427 U.S. at 59.
2 See, e.g., Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 42-43 (1966).
'"The Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Cour4 supra note 7, at 77.
2 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
"' SeePlanned Parenthood v. Miller, 63 F.3d 1452 (8th Cir. 1995).
2 See Planned Parenthood v. Miller, 195 F.3d 386 (8th Cir. 1999); Carhart v. Stenberg, 192
F.3d 1142 (8th Cir. 1999); Little Rock Family Planning Servs. v. Jegley, 192 F.3d 794 (8th Cir.
1999); Women's Med. Prof. Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.Sd 187, 200 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied,
118 S. Ct. 1347 (1998); Causeway Med. Suite v. Foster, 43 F. Supp. 2d 604, 619 (E.D. La. 1999);
Planned Parenthood v. Verniero, 41 F. Supp. 2d 478, 493-94 (D.N.J. 1998); A Choice for Women
v. Butterworth, 54 F. Supp. 2d 1148, 1158 (S.D. Fla., 1998); Eubanks v. Stengel, 28 F. Supp. 2d
1024, 1036 (W.D. Ky. 1998); Daniel v. Underwood, No. 2:98-0495, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22290,
*12 (S.D. W. Va. Nov. 5, 1998); Planned Parenthood v. Woods, 982 F. Supp. 1369, 1379 (D. Ariz.
1997); Evans, 977 F. Supp. at 1311; Bell, supra note 4, at B3.
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largely unprecedented, even in the First Amendment cases.218
Judge Luttig of the Fourth Circuit, in his order staying a pre-
liminary injunction granted by the district court against the Vir-
ginia ban, criticized the district court for just such overreaching
as follows:
Instead of presuming the statute constitutional and indulging the
assumption, mandated by our federalism, that the State will, where nec-
essary, construe its statutes so as to ensure their constitutionality, the dis-
trict court all but presumed the statute unconstitutional and, where the
slightest ambiguity in the statute's language arguably existed, assumed..
. that the State would adopt and enforce a construction of the statute
that would render it unconstitutional.
21 9
Judge Luttig further criticized the District Court for utterly
failing to take into account the assurances from the Attorney
General and the Governor of Virginia that the state would not
prosecute physicians for performing any procedure other than
D&Xs. 220 Judge Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit echoed this
criticism, stating:
The Attorneys General of Illinois and Wisconsin, the principal defen-
dants, tell us that their statutes are concerned only with the D&X proce-
dure and will be enforced only against its use. That assurance might be
enough by itself, in the absence of any contrary indication from the state
judiciary, to resolve immediate vagueness concerns.221
The significance of the problem cannot be overlooked. As
in all legislation, the legislature must be allowed leeway in draft-
ing criminal statutes such that they do not provide loopholes for
those at whom the statute is aimed. In refusing to grant the leg-
islatures this leeway in drafting the partial-birth abortion bans,
the thirteen federal courts that have struck down or enjoined
enforcement of these bans on void-for-vagueness grounds have
done a disservice to the principles of federalism. The partial-
birth abortion bans may or may not be unconstitutional. How-
ever, their constitutionality does not turn on the alleged vague-
ness of the language.
"' See supra Part III.B. See also Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Gilmore, 144 F.3d 326 (4th
Cir. 1998).
"' Gilmore, 144 F.3d at 332. See also Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Gilmore, 11 F. Supp.
2d 795, 811-19 (E.D. Va. 1998).
2 144 F.3d at 331.
The Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 195 F.3d 857, 865 (7th Cir. 1999).
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